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Abstract
We study a question answering problem on a so-
cial network, where a requester is seeking an an-
swer from the agents on the network. The goal
is to design reward mechanisms to incentivize the
agents to propagate the requester’s query to their
neighbours if they don’t have the answer. Ex-
isting mechanisms are vulnerable to Sybil-attacks,
i.e., an agent may get more reward by creating
fake identities. Hence, we combat this problem
by first proving some impossibility results to re-
solve Sybil-attacks and then characterizing a class
of mechanisms which satisfy Sybil-proofness (pre-
vents Sybil-attacks) as well as other desirable prop-
erties. Except for Sybil-proofness, we also consider
cost minimization for the requester and agents’ col-
lusions.
1 Introduction
The development of online social networks has offered
many opportunities for people to collaborate remotely in
real time, such as P2P file-sharing network (e.g., BitTorrent)
and Q&A platforms (e.g., Quora and Stack Overflow). In-
spired by these applications, there are rich theoretical stud-
ies to look at the mechanism design problems on social net-
works [Rahman, 2009; Emek et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017].
In this paper, we focus on the answer/resource query-
ing mechanisms via a social network where a requester is
searching for a single answer from the network. Here we
have two main challenges. The first is that the requester
is only connected to a few agents (her neighbours) on the
network and she needs to find a way to inform the other
agents on the network if her neighbours do not have the
answer. This can be achieved by incentivizing her neigh-
bours to propagate the query to their neighbours (diffu-
sion incentives). Kleinberg and Raghavan [2005] first for-
mulated diffusion incentives in query networks. Later on,
Arcaute et al. [2007] and Kota and Narahari [2010] studied
the threshold of rewards needed to incentivize the query net-
work. Kleinberg [2007] further discussed whether agents
will act as the requester expects under different reward
settings. Similar approach has been applied in advertis-
ing [Li and Shiu, 2012], auctions [Zhao et al., 2018], recom-
mendations [Margaris et al., 2016] and others.
Once the first challenge is sovled, then an im-
mediate new challenge is Sybil attacks, where an
agent pretends to be multiple agents to gain more re-
wards [Conitzer et al., 2010]. Sybil attack has been studied
in many other applications such as multi-level market-
ing [Emek et al., 2011; Drucker and Fleischer, 2012;
Shen et al., 2019], social choice [Conitzer and Yokoo, 2010]
and blockchains [Babaioff et al., 2012; Ersoy et al., 2018].
For query networks, Sybil attack has been investigated under
various settings. For example, Seuken and Parkes [2014]
studied the trade-off between the transitive trust and Sybil
attacks in P2P file-sharing networks. Chen et al. [2013]
proposed a mechanism based on the query incentive net-
work [Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2005] which achieves
Sybil-proofness in expectation. Nath et al. [2012] identified
a collusion-proof mechanism with approximated Sybil-
proofness. However, all the existing work has only discussed
Sybil-proofness in approximation or expectation on query
networks.
Therefore, in this paper, we aim to solve both challenges
in a dominant strategy implementation for query networks.
We first demonstrate the difficulties to solve the challenges by
proving the impossibility results. We then characterize a class
of mechanisms, called double geometric mechanism (DGM),
to satisfy the desirable properties. Except for the diffusion
incentive and Sybil-proofness, we also look at the cost min-
imization problem for the requester and preventing agents’
collusion. We will show that Sybil-proofness and collusion-
proofness are not compatible.
1.1 Related Work
The query incentive network model was first proposed by
Kleinberg and Raghavan [2005], where each agent in a d-ary
tree network has the same probability to hold the answer and
the actual query network is generated by a branching pro-
cess (the cost in the query process is negligible). They con-
sidered a decentralized reward mechanism where each agent
strategically chooses a fixed amount of reward to offer to her
children if she can receive the answer from them. Different
from the fixed reward mechanism, Cebrian et al. [2012] pro-
posed a split contract mechanism in the same setting, which
was motivated by the success of the winning strategy in the
DARPA 2009 Network Challenge [Pickard et al., 2011]. In
their split contract mechanism, each agent should determine
the splits of the reward received from her parent to offer to her
children. In both studies, they only considered the Nash equi-
librium implementation, while we consider dominant strategy
implementation here.
Moreover, the studies mentioned above mainly focused on
propagating the query in the network and they did not con-
sider agents’ Sybil attacks. However, when we consider cen-
tralized query mechanisms where the reward distribution is
decided by the requester, Sybil attack is a problem if the re-
quester cannot verify their indenties [Douceur, 2002]. In the
previous work, Chen et al. [2013] proved that split contract
mechanisms cannot prevent Sybil attacks. They proposed di-
rect referral mechanism to deal with this problem by allocat-
ing the majority of the reward to the winner (the agent who
holds the answer) as well as her parent, i.e., the direct refer-
ral. However, the Sybil-proofness of the direct referral mech-
anism is only in expectation, which means that Sybil attack
might be beneficial for an agent if the agent can acquire more
knowledge about the network.
Again for Syblil-proofness, in the setting of dominant strat-
egy implementation, Nath et al. [2012] studied the split con-
tract mechanism design. They identified a set of desirable
properties including Sybil-proofness and collusion-proofness
and proved that no mechanism can satisfy them simultane-
ously under some conditions. They also examined the well-
known geometric mechanism and showed that it satisfies
collusion-proofness and approximated Sybil-proofness.
Different from the above, in this paper, we investigate cen-
tralized Sybil-proof reward mechanism design in the query
network under dominant strategy implementation. We char-
acterize a class of mechanisms to achieve Sybil-proofness and
other properties in the query network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the model of the query network and intro-
duces the desirable properties of the rewardmechanism. Then
we prove the impossibility results in Section 3. Following
that, we propose our double geometric mechanism and char-
acterize its uniqueness under different properties in Section 4.
Finally, we conclude and discuss the future work in Section 5.
2 The Model
We consider a question answering setting where a requester
r is seeking the answer of a question from a set of agents.
The agents are connected via their social connections such
as friendship and r connects to a subset of them. r will first
ask her neighbours for the answer and if her neighbours do
not have the answer, r wants her neighbours to further prop-
agate the question to their neighbours and so on. We assume
that there is at least one agent who holds the answer and the
answer is unique/verifiable. The goal of r is to design a re-
ward mechanism to find the answer from the network. Ide-
ally, we want each agent to offer the answer if she has, oth-
erwise, to propagate the question to her neighbours if there is
any. Formally, the propagation process will build a query tree
T = (V,E) rooted at r, where V is the set of all agents, in-
cluding the requester r, who have been asked for the answer,
and each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E means that agent i has propa-
gated the query to agent j and j has either offered the answer
or propagated the question to her neighbours. For each agent
i in T , let p(i) be i’s direct parent and s(i) be i’s direct chil-
dren set.
We assume that there is one agent in T who offered the
answer, which is called the winner, denoted by w. It is clear
that w 6= r and if there are multiple agents offered the an-
swer, we choose the one with the smallest depth with random
tie-breaking. We call the path from r to w a winning path,
denoted by pw = (i1, i2, . . . , in), where i1 ∈ s(r), in = w,
(ij , ij+1) ∈ E for all 1 ≤ j < n and n is the length of the
winning path.
Given the above setting, the requester needs to design a
reward mechanism M : T → RV \{r} to incentivize the
agents to find the answer, where T is the space of all pos-
sible resulting query trees and the output is the reward al-
location for each player in the tree. Denote the reward
allocated to agent i by xi. In this paper, we focus on
path mechanisms, which are mostly studied in the litera-
ture [Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2005; Chen et al., 2013].
Definition 1. A reward mechanism is called a path mecha-
nism if
1. it only assigns non-zero rewards to the agents on the
winning path, i.e., xi = 0 for all i /∈ pw,
2. the reward distributed to an agent on the winning path
only depends on her depth and the length of the path.
That is, a path mechanismM can be represented by a reward
function x : N× N→ R for the agents on the winning path,
where the first parameter is the agent’s depth and the second
parameter is the length of the winning path.
A path mechanism only rewards the agents on the winning
path in the resulting query network. This will not weaken our
results since the agents on the winning path made the actual
contribution for seeking the answer. We assume that the cost
for the query propagation is negligible as the propagation is
often easy or automated [Yu and Singh, 2003]. Therefore, the
literature has also focused on path mechanisms.
In the following, we define the desirable properties for path
mechanisms. Firstly, it should incentivize agents to offer the
answer or further propagate the query to all their neighbours;
otherwise, the query will stop at the requester’s neighbours.
We call this property incentive compatibility.
Definition 2. A path mechanism is incentive compatible (IC)
if for all agent i, xi ≥ x
′
i, where
• xi is the reward i receives if i truthfully reports her an-
swer, if i has the answer, or propagates the query to all
her neighbours if i does not have the answer,
• x′i is the reward i receives if i behaves differently.
An incentive compatible mechanism guarantees that it will
always find the answer if there is one in the network. Sec-
ondly, we also require that every agent is not forced to partic-
ipate in the mechanism, i.e., their reward should not be nega-
tive, which is called individual rationality.
Definition 3. A path mechanism is individually rational (IR)
if for all agent i ∈ pw, xi ≥ 0, i.e., x(j, n) ≥ 0 for all
j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n. It is strongly individually rational (SIR)
if for all agent i ∈ pw, xi > 0, i.e., x(j, n) > 0 for all
j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n.
Notice that IR property can be easily satisfied even if the
mechanism does not give any reward to any agent. Therefore,
we also look for strongly IR path mechanisms, which at least
reward something for every agent in the winning path. At the
same time, the requester may also want to control the total
reward distributed.
Definition 4. A path mechanism is budget constrained (BC)
if there exists a constant B <∞ such that∑
i∈pw
xi =
n∑
j=1
x(j, n) ≤ B
for all resulting query network T , for all winning path pw of
length n in T .
Next, we consider the most important property of Sybil-
proofness, which requires that the mechanism should be re-
sistant to Sybil-attacks. Since the resulting query network
is a tree and we focus on path mechanisms, fake identities
which are not on the winning path benefit nothing. So there
is only one kind of meaningful Sybil-attacks for agent i, i.e.,
pretending to be multiple agents from agent p(i) to agents in
s(i) (extending the paths from p(i) to s(i)).
Definition 5. A path mechanism is Sybil-proof (SP) if for
any winning path pw = (i1, i2, . . . , in), if an agent ij ∈ pw
extends pw by makingm copies of herself to get the new win-
ning path p′w = (i1, . . . , ij−1, i
0
j , i
1
j , . . . , i
m
j , ij+1, . . . , in),
we have:
xij = x(j, n) ≥
m∑
k=0
x′
ik
j
=
m∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+m) (1)
Intuitively, if an agent pretends to be multiple agents along
the winning path, the property of Sybil-proofness ensures that
the total rewards she can get from the multiple agents is not
more than what she will get originally. In our setting, Sybil-
proofness can be easily verified as stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. A path mechanism is Sybil-proof if and only
if
x(j, n) ≥ x(j, n+ 1) + x(j + 1, n+ 1)
for all j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n.
Proof. (“⇒”) If a path mechanism is Sybil-proof, then in
Inequality (1), let m = 1, it can be easily derived that
x(j, n) ≥ x(j, n + 1) + x(j + 1, n + 1) for all j, n ∈ Z+,
j ≤ n.
(“⇐”) If a path mechanism satisfies x(j, n) ≥ x(j, n +
1) + x(j + 1, n+ 1) for all j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n, then
x(j, n) ≥ x(j, n + 1) + x(j + 1, n+ 1)
≥ (x(j, n + 2) + x(j + 1, n+ 2))
+ (x(j + 1, n+ 2) + x(j + 2, n+ 2))
≥
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
x(j + k, n+m)
≥
m∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+m)
for all j, n,m ∈ Z+, j ≤ n. Hence, the mechanism is Sybil-
proof.
Sybil-proofness says that an agent cannot gain by
making multiple copies of herself, while another prop-
erty says multiple agents could also not collude together
to receive a better reward, which is called collusion-
proofness [Chen et al., 2018]. We will show that these two
properties cannot be satisfied together in general.
Definition 6. A path mechanism is λ-collusion proof (λ-CP)
(λ ∈ Z+ and λ > 1) if
x(j, n) ≤
λ′−1∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+ λ′ − 1) (2)
for all 1 ≤ λ′ ≤ λ, all j, n ∈ Z+ such that j ≤ n−λ′+1. If
λ-collusion proof holds for all λ > 1, i.e.,
x(j, n) ≤
m∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+m)
for all j, n,m ∈ Z+ such that j ≤ n, then, we call this
mechanism collusion-proof (CP).
Intuitively, λ-collusion proofness indicates that any group
of agents with size less than λ cannot get more reward if they
pretend to be a single agent. Collusion proofness requires
this to be held for all group sizes. In real-world applications,
agents’ ability to form a collusion is always limited as, for ex-
ample, it is not easy to collude for agents far from each other
in the network. Thus, λ-collusion proofness is an applicable
approximation of collusion proofness in practice.
Lastly, to guarantee the reward distributed to agents on the
winning path is sufficient, we require that each agent on the
winning path can get at least a certain fraction of the winner’s
reward. This property is inspired by the efficiency of split
contracts [Cebrian et al., 2012].
Definition 7. A path mechanism is ρ-split secure (ρ-SS), 0 <
ρ < 1, if for all agent ij ∈ pw \ {w}, xij ≥ ρxij+1 , i.e.,
x(j, n) ≥ ρx(j + 1, n) for all j, n ∈ Z+, j < n.
Intuitively, the property of ρ-split security ensures that each
agent on the winning path other than the winner has at least ρ
fraction of the reward distributed to her children on the win-
ning path. This guarantee will encourage agents to propagate
the query in reality.
3 Impossibility Results
Before characterizing the reward mechanisms that satisfy the
desirable properties, we prove several impossibility results in
this section.
The first impossibility is that if strongly IR is required (i.e.,
each agent on the winning path is rewarded more than zero),
Sybil-proofness and collusion-proofness cannot be held to-
gether.
Lemma 1. An SIR path mechanism cannot be both Sybil-
proof and λ-collusion-proof for all λ ≥ 3.
Proof. If such a mechanism exists, then according to the in-
equality in Proposition 1, letm = λ− 1 and we have
x(j, n) ≥
λ−1∑
k=0
(
λ− 1
k
)
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1)
≥
λ−1∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1) (3)
for any j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n−λ+1. Togetherwith Inequality (2),
we know that
x(j, n) =
λ−1∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1)
Hence, the middle part of Inequality (3) is equal to both the
left hand side and the right hand side.
λ−1∑
k=0
(
λ− 1
k
)
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1) =
λ−1∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1)
Then, since λ ≥ 3 and
(
λ−1
0
)
=
(
λ−1
λ−1
)
= 1,
λ−2∑
k=1
(
λ− 1
k
)
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1) =
λ−2∑
k=1
x(j + k, n+ λ− 1)
from which we can derive that x(j + k, n + λ − 1) = 0 for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ λ − 2 since
(
λ−1
k
)
> 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ λ − 2.
This is a contradiction with SIR.
Following Lemma 1, we can conclude that under the re-
quirement of SIR, being both Sybil-proof and collusion-proof
is impossible for a path mechanism.
Proposition 2. An SIR path mechanism cannot be both Sybil-
proof and collusion-proof.
However, we will show that the property of 2-collusion-
proof, which says that two agents cannot collude to make a
gain, can be satisfied with Sybil-proofness in Section 4.
The impossibility assumes strongly IR. However, even if
we weaken the condition to be IR, Theorem 1 shows that the
only mechanisms to satisfy both SP and CP are limited to
very special mechanisms called two-headed mechanism.
Mechanism 1. A path mechanism is a two-headed mecha-
nism if its reward function satisfies
x(j, n) =


a+ b if j = 1 and n = 1
a if j = 1 and n > 1
b if j = n and n > 1
0 otherwise
where a, b ≥ 0 are constants.
Intuitively, a two-headed mechanism only allocates posi-
tive rewards to the first agent and the winner on the winning
path and all the other agents receive a zero reward.
Theorem 1. A path mechanism is IR, SP and CP if and only
if it is a two-headed mechanism.
Proof. (“⇐”) First, it is easy to show that a two-headed
mechanism is IR, SP and CP since x(j, n) ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
x(j, n) = a+ b
for all j, n ∈ Z+ and j ≤ n.
(“⇒”) Then we show that these three properties determine
a two-headed mechanism. From the definition of CP, we
know that the mechanism is λ-CP for all λ > 1. Then from
Lemma 1 we know that a mechanism with SP and λ-CP sat-
isfies x(j, n) = 0 for all 1 < j < n and n > 1. Hence, from
SP and 2-CP we can derive that
x(1, 2) = x(1, 3) + x(2, 3) = x(1, 3) = · · · = x(1, n)
and
x(2, 2) = x(2, 3) + x(3, 3) = x(3, 3) = · · · = x(n, n)
for all n > 1.
Hence, there exist two constants a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 such
that x(1, n) = a, x(n, n) = b for all n > 1 and x(1, 1) =
x(1, 2) + x(2, 2) = a+ b.
4 Double Geometric Mechanism
In this section, we characterize a class of reward mechanisms
with the desirable properties. The mechanism we will char-
acterize is called Double Geometric Mechanism (DGM),
which is a path mechanism defined by two parameters.
Mechanism 2. A path mechanism is an (α, δ) double geo-
metric mechanism ((α, δ)-DGM), for 0 < α < 1 and δ > 0,
if its reward function satisfies
x(j, n) = (1− α)j−1αn−jδ
for all j, n ∈ Z+ such that j ≤ n.
Intuitively, (α, δ)-DGM has two fractions αn−j and (1 −
α)j−1, which are controlled by the distance to the winner and
the requester respectively. Note that if α < 1/2, the reward
is strictly monotone decreasing with the depth on the win-
ning path, while if α > 1/2, the reward is strictly monotone
increasing with the depth on the winning path. Theorem 2
shows that (α, δ)-DGM can satisfy all the desirable proper-
ties defined in our model.
Theorem 2. If a path mechanism is an (α, δ)-DGM with
ρ
1+ρ ≤ α <
1
2 (0 < ρ < 1), then it is IC, SIR, BC, SP,
2-CP and ρ-SS.
Proof. Suppose the winning path is (i1, i2, . . . , in) of length
n when the agents behave truthfully. For an agent ij with 1 ≤
j < n, xij = x(j, n), if she did not query all her neighbours,
then she will be either on the winning path of length ≥ n or
not on the winning path. By doing so, her reward is either
x(j, n + k) = (1 − α)j−1αn−j+kδ ≤ (1 − α)j−1αn−jδ =
x(j, n) for some k ≥ 0, or zero, which is not better than
behaving truthfully. For the winner in = w, if she did not
provide the answer and further queried her children, then she
would be either on the winning path of length > n or not on
the winning path, which gives her a reward either x(n, n +
k) = (1 − α)n−1αkδ < (1 − α)n−1δ = x(n, n) for some
k ≥ 1 or zero. Hence, (α, δ)-DGM is IC.
For all j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n, we have x(j, n) = (1 −
α)j−1αn−jδ > 0. Hence, (α, δ)-DGM is SIR.
For all j, n ∈ Z+, j ≤ n and 0 < α < 12 , we have
n∑
j=1
x(j, n) =
n∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1αn−jδ
=
αnδ
1− α
n∑
j=1
(
1− α
α
)j
=
αn − (1− α)n
2α− 1
· δ ≤ δ
Hence, (α, δ)-DGM is BC.
For all j, n ∈ Z+, j < n, we have
x(j, n) = αx(j, n) + (1− α)x(j, n)
= α(1 − α)j−1αn−jδ + (1− α)(1 − α)j−1αn−jδ
= (1− α)j−1αn+1−jδ + (1− α)jαn+1−(j−1)δ
= x(j, n+ 1) + x(j + 1, n+ 1)
Hence, (α, δ)-DGM is 2-CP. According to Proposition 1, it is
also SP.
Finally, for all j, n ∈ Z+, j < n, we have
x(j, n)
x(j + 1, n)
=
α
1− α
≥
ρ/(1 + ρ)
1− ρ/(1 + ρ)
= ρ
Hence, (α, δ)-DGM is ρ-SS.
(α, δ)-DGM satisfies all the desirable properties. Then we
wonder are they the only mechanisms to satisfy these proper-
ties. Under some mild conditions, we will prove that (α, δ)-
DGM is indeed the only mechanism to satisfy all the proper-
ties.
Note that if there are only two agents on the winning path,
it is a very special case that has almost no constraints (the re-
ward can be assigned arbitrarily), which suggests that it acts
like an initial condition to the reward function. To satisfy the
property of ρ-SS, we should have x(1, 2) ≥ ρx(2, 2) and we
let x(1, 2) = ρx(2, 2), which is the simplest way to construct
the initial condition. We say a mechanism uses ρ-base con-
dition if its reward function x satisfies x(1, 2) = ρx(2, 2).
Theorem 3 proves that under the base condition, (α, δ)-DGM
is the only kind of mechanism to satisfy all the properties.
Theorem 3. If a path mechanism is IC, SIR, BC, SP, 2-CP, ρ-
SS and uses ρ-base condition, then it is an (α, δ)-DGM with
α = ρ1+ρ .
Proof. First consider the value x(j, n), x(j + 1, n), x(j, n+
1), x(j+1, n+1) and x(j+2, n+1) for some j, n ∈ Z+ and
j < n. Suppose that x(j, n) = γx(j + 1, n), x(j, n + 1) =
γ2x(j + 1, n+ 1) and x(j + 1, n+ 1) = γ1x(j + 2, n+ 1).
Then according to the property of SP and 2-CP, we know
that x(j, n) = x(j, n+1)+x(j+1, n+1) and x(j+1, n) =
x(j + 1, n+ 1) + x(j + 2, n+ 1), from which we have
x(j, n) = (1 + γ2)γ1x(j + 2, n+ 1)
x(j + 1, n) = (1 + γ1)x(j + 2, n+ 1)
Hence, by x(j, n) = γx(j + 1, n), we have
γ2 = γ
(
1 +
1
γ1
)
− 1
where according to the property of ρ-SS, we have γ ≥ ρ,
γ1 ≥ ρ and γ2 ≥ ρ.
If x(j, n) = ρx(j + 1, n), i.e., γ = ρ, then
γ2 = ρ
(
1 +
1
γ1
)
− 1 ≥ ρ
which suggests that γ1 ≤ ρ. Hence γ1 = ρ and then γ2 = ρ.
Note that we have x(1, 2) = ρx(2, 2) as the base condition,
so from above we have x(1, 3) = ρx(2, 3) and x(2, 3) =
ρx(3, 3). Then, by induction, x(j, n) = ρx(j+1, n) holds for
any j, n ∈ Z+ and j < n. Therefore, the following recursive
relation holds for any j, n ∈ Z+ and j ≤ n:{
x(j, n+ 1) = ρ1+ρx(j, n)
x(j + 1, n+ 1) = 11+ρx(j, n)
Denote δ = x(1, 1) > 0, then we can derive that
x(j, n) =
(
1
1 + ρ
)j−1 (
ρ
1 + ρ
)n−j
δ = (1− α)j−1αn−jδ
with α = ρ/(1+ρ) for any j, n ∈ Z+ and j ≤ n, which is an
(α, δ)-DGM. Also according to Theorem 2, the property of
IC, SIR and BC will not be hurt. Therefore, these properties
will uniquely determine the (α, δ)-DGM.
So far, we have shown that (α, δ)-DGM is the only kind
of mechanism to satisfy the properties under the ρ-base con-
dition. Note that, without the ρ-base condition, we may get
a different mechanism to satisfy all the properties, but it is
still a DGM-like mechanism with a bounded difference. It
suggests that the space of mechanisms removed by this base
condition is also limited. Therefore, the base condition does
not significantly hurt the generality of our result.
As Proposition 2 shows that SP and CP cannot be held to-
gether under SIR, the above mechanism can only satisfy 2-
CP. In the following, we show how much extra gain a group
of agents could get if they collude together and a weaker con-
cept of CP. Furthermore, we will investigate the cost of the
requester and show how to minimize it.
4.1 Approximation of Collusion-proofness
Definition 8. A path mechanism is called β-approximate
collusion-proof (β-ACP) if its reward function x satisfies
x(j, n) ≤ β
m∑
k=0
x(j + k, n+m)
for all j, n,m ∈ Z+, j ≤ n.
Intuitively, the property of β-approximate collusion-proof
ensures that if some agents pretend to be a single agent,
they can achieve at most β times of their original reward.
However, we show that a constant approximation cannot be
achieved along with the other properties.
Proposition 3. An IC, SIR, BC, SP, 2-CP and ρ-SS path
mechanism with ρ-base condition cannot be (1 + ǫ)-ACP for
any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Note that an IC, SIR, BC, SP, 2-CP and ρ-SS path
mechanism with ρ-base condition must be an (α, δ)-DGM
with α = ρ/(1 + ρ). Then (1 + ǫ)-ACP implies that
(1− α)j−1αn−jδ ≤ (1 + ǫ)
m∑
k=0
(1− α)j+k−1αn+m−j−kδ
from which we can derive that
(1− α)m+1 − αm+1 ≥
1− 2α
1 + ǫ
However, for any given ǫ > 0 and 0 < α < 1/2, there
existsN > 0 such that for anym > N , (1−α)m+1−αm+1 <
(1−2α)/(1+ǫ) since the left hand side approaches to 0 when
m approaches to∞. Hence, it cannot be (1 + ǫ)-ACP.
On the other hand, an exponential approximation is easy to
be achieved by an (α, δ)-DGM.
Theorem 4. If a path mechanism is an (α, δ)-DGM with 0 <
α < 12 , then it is 2
m-ACP, where m is the number of agents
who collude together.
Proof. If an (α, δ)-DGM is 2m-ACP, it suggests that
(1− α)j−1αn−jδ ≤ 2m
m∑
k=0
(1 − α)j+k−1αn+m−j−kδ
from which we can derive the equivalent inequality that
(1− α)m+1 − αm+1 ≥
1− 2α
2m
or being rearranged as
(1− α)m+1 −
1− α
2m
≥ αm+1 −
α
2m
Notice that for function f(y) = y
(
ym − 12m
)
, f(y) < 0
for any 0 < y < 1/2 and f(y) > 0 for any 1/2 < y < 1.
Since 0 < α < 1/2, the above inequality always holds.
4.2 Cost Minimization
Next, we consider the case where the requester is willing to
minimize her cost to query the answer.
Definition 9. A path mechanism is of minimum cost over a
class of path mechanisms X if its reward function x satisfies
x ∈ argmin
x∈X
n∑
j=1
x(j, n)
for all n ∈ Z+.
Intuitively, a path mechanism is of minimum cost if it can
minimize the total reward distributed to the agents on the
winning path. Notice that when we minimize the cost, we
consider time-critical mechanisms, which are essential to the
real-world application [Pickard et al., 2011]. A path mecha-
nism is time-critical if the winner always takes the maximum
reward, i.e., x(n, n) = maxj x(j, n) for any n ≥ 1. Now
we show that the (α, δ)-DGM also characterizes the space of
time-critical mechanisms of minimum cost.
Theorem 5. A path mechanism is of minimum cost over a
class of time-critical path mechanisms that satisfy IC, SIR,
BC, SP, 2-CP, ρ-SS and have x(1, 1) = δ if and only if it is an
(α, δ)-DGM with α = 1/2.
Proof. First we show a lower bound of the total cost before
we prove the statement. According to the property of SP and
2-CP, denote
∑n
j=1 x(j, n) = Rn, then we have
2Rn+1 = Rn + (x(1, n+ 1) + x(n+ 1, n+ 1))
with R1 = R2 = δ. Hence, to minimize the total cost is to
minimize the term x(1, n + 1) + x(n + 1, n + 1). Suppose
that x(1, 2) = γx(2, 2), x(1, 3) = γ2x(2, 3) and x(2, 3) =
γ1x(3, 3) where ρ ≤ γ, γ1, γ2 ≤ 1 with γ = ρ + ǫ. Then
similar to the process in Theorem 3, we can derive that γ2 =
γ(1 + 1/γ1)− 1 and γ1 ≤ (ρ+ ǫ)/(1− ǫ). Hence,
x(1, 3) + x(3, 3) ≥
(
1−
2(ρ+ ǫ)
(ρ+ 1)(1 + ρ+ ǫ)
)
δ
As we want to minimize the cost, the minimum value will
be reached if γ = γ1 = γ2 = 1, which means x(1, 2) =
x(2, 2) and x(1, 3) = x(2, 3) = x(3, 3). By induction, if
for some n, x(j, n) = x(j + 1, n) for any j < n, suppose
x(j, n+ 1) = γjx(j + 1, n+ 1) for any j ≤ n, then we have
1 + γn = γn(1 + γn−1) = · · · = γn · · · γ2(1 + γ1) with
ρ ≤ γj ≤ 1. So that the solution could only be γ1 = · · · =
γn = 1. Therefore, x(j, n) = x(j + 1, n) for any j, n ∈ Z
+
and j < n.
(“⇐”) First, an (α, δ)-DGM is IC, SIR, BC, SP, 2-CP, ρ-
SS and have x(1, 1) = δ by Theorem 2. Then, for an (α, δ)-
DGM with α = 1/2, the total reward distributed is
n∑
j=1
x(j, n) =
n∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1αn−jδ = n
(
1
2
)n−1
δ
for any n ≥ 1. Besides, from the above we know 2Rn ≥
Rn−1 + δ/2
n−2 for n ≥ 3 and R2 = δ. Then Rn ≥
(nδ)/2n−1. Since (α, δ)-DGM with α = 1/2 meets this
lower bound, then it is the mechanism of minimum cost.
(“⇒”) By the equation of x(j, n) = x(j + 1, n) and
x(1, 1) = δ, we can derive that x(j, n) = δ/2n−1, which is
the same as for the (1/2, δ)-DGM. Therefore, the mechanism
of minimum cost over these properties uniquely determines
the (1/2, δ)-DGM.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated Sybil-proof answer querying mecha-
nisms on networks in a dominant strategy implementation.
We proposed a class of double geometricmechanisms (DGM)
to against Sybil attacks and characterized its uniqueness un-
der other important properties such as IC, IR and 2-CP. We
also characterized the mechanisms for minimizing the re-
quester’s reward expenses and illustrated the performance of
the mechanisms in terms of the approximation of collusion-
proofness. There are several other interesting aspects worth
further investigation. There is a gap between constant ap-
proximation and exponential approximation of collusion-
proofness. The characterization of Sybil-proof mechanisms
in a general directed graph is also missing.
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